In a world dominated by a growing technology gap and strategic competition, cooperation in science and technology appears to be an important part of the EU and Latin America’s autonomy. To do this, they have a network of regional, sub-regional, bilateral and sub-national agreements, one of the most extensive and complex in the world.
The most recent upheaval in the field of geopolitics confirms that the international system is not necessarily in a phase of globalization, but is facing a reshaping of the logic behind the global value chains that characterize the post-Cold War economy. This change shows a temporary imbalance of these value chains, which will lead to a new strategic linkage in the second quarter of the 21st century.
As a result of multilateral globalization over the past 50 years under liberal regulatory forms that peaked after China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, the logic of delocalized production that characterized the economic order until recently accelerated the transformation of Eastern capitalist economies. However, in the second decade of this century, global value chains began to tighten, and some linkages began to bear fruit under the influence of major world events of a different nature, driving the current phase of partial disconnection: the financial crisis of 2008; H1N1 flu and Covid-19 pandemics; Failure of the Doha Round; Realization of Brexit; A large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and consequent economic sanctions against Russia.
However, the main fact that has affected the current restructuring of global value chains is the escalation of the conflict between the US and China, which has its core in science and technology. The loss of high value-added market shares, as well as the loss of control of technologies strategic to China’s defense and global influence in the face of China, have generated a vigorous response from the United States.
In this way, faced with the convergence of two opposing centers, the European Union remains relatively behind, while Latin America and the Caribbean become the subject of disputes over resources and markets.
However, beyond tensions in production, business and scientific-technological matters, interdependence is a constant phenomenon that reflects some inevitable dimensions of globalization, which is evident in the financial sector or environmental crisis management, as well as in information management and circulation, in relation to the production and diffusion of knowledge and technology.
“In shifts in techno-economic paradigms, countries that manage to ride the emerging technology wave early gain higher incomes and long-term competitive advantages.”
Therefore, in the face of these centripetal and centrifugal dynamics – we must ask ourselves what will be the trends guiding the rules and principles of the international system in the coming years. Particularly in science-technological matters, the recent UNCTAD Report on Technology and Innovation (2023) warns of an ever-widening gap between core and peripheral countries. . In this sense, the green transition represents a new opportunity for developing countries.
The report states that the international community should establish universal rules for technology transfer that allow the development of emerging green industries in peripheral countries. Let’s remember that the main deficit of these countries is found in the lack of investment to improve infrastructure and material capabilities. As a result, central states dominate international trade related to green technologies, increase their share of total exports, and receive more new technologies.
On the other hand, another trend related to the described production dynamics is the consolidation of a multipolar world structured by interregional association strategies based on the construction of circles of geopolitical foundation, which, in economic terms, Janet Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, called “buddy-shoring”.
“A multipolar world is integrated where strategies of interregional association prevail based on the construction of circles of geopolitical trust”
In this context, Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union face growing challenges, but also extraordinary opportunities. One of the unsurprising consequences relates to the fact that in recent years, foreign policy debates in both regions have once again revolved around the path to greater autonomy. In recent years, concepts such as “relational autonomy” and “dysfunctional alignment” have emerged in Latin America. The latter is specifically designed for the context of the bidding between the US and China and, therefore, seeks to cover discussions of economic, financial and technical issues.
In the EU, the challenge of coordinating a common foreign policy around the idea of strategic autonomy has also regained importance. As High Representative Joseph Borrell points out, although the concept has long been linked to autonomy from the United States in matters of defense and security, in recent years it has been extended to include other areas. In fact, related to trade, investment and financing, cooperation in scientific and technological matters, the EU is the most likely areas to dispute the power gaps with the protagonists of this global situation.
In this sense, the technology sector becomes an important context for rethinking collective strategies, as it is the central focus of the hegemonic dispute that drags on the restructuring of global value chains. After all, the EU itself has been trying for years to equip itself with a science diplomacy policy to face these challenges, as demonstrated by initiatives such as the European Science Diplomacy Alliance launched within the framework of Horizon 2020.
Thus, cooperation in science and technology emerges as an area that both the EU and Latin America seek to strengthen in order to expand their autonomy. For this, they have a network of existing agreements between the two regions at the regional, sub-regional, bilateral and sub-national level, one of the most extensive and complex in the world.
EU-CELAC Bi-Regional Strategic Alliance in Science and Technology
In 2015, the Summit of Heads of State and Government between the European Union and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) defined recent major developments in terms of interregional scientific and technological cooperation. There, the Action Plan was drawn up, with its first chapter on “Science, Research, Innovation and Technology”, a guiding objective to foster a common knowledge space by promoting cooperation in research and innovation, skills and infrastructure development, technology transfer for sustainable development and cooperation in the digital economy. Likewise, chapter nine seeks to promote collaboration in higher education through greater exchange and mobility.
These objectives were reinforced in the framework of the 2021-23 Roadmap, where new cooperation opportunities were analyzed, highlighting the energy transition, European investments in Latin America that are high but are being reduced by the rise of China. In addition, the possibility of deepening cooperation on the decarbonization of the economy (Green Agenda) and governance of the oceans (Blue Agenda) was highlighted.
As a result of this collaboration, important projects are in operation today, such as BELLA II, which seeks to extend the submarine fiber optic cable to promote the Latin American digital transformation, or Copernicus, which opens new opportunities for collaboration in the field of satellite analysis. The extension of the Horizon Europe Program (2021-27) should be highlighted through joint projects and the participation of Latin American researchers in projects funded by the European Union.
This year’s EU-CELAC Summit, held on 17 and 18 July, focused on food security, energy transition, health self-sufficiency and digital transformation. In addition to the natural resources needed to transition to green technologies, the Summit constitutes an indispensable opportunity to strengthen bi-regional relations and re-examine the challenge of equitable and just restructuring, as Latin America can contribute with qualified human resources to highly complementary agendas.
Therefore, the EU seeks to resign the idea of strategic autonomy as a guide for foreign operations based on self-sufficiency and alliances with stable and reliable suppliers, with a view to integrating new regional value chains. At the same time, for Latin America, it is an opportunity to overcome its “non-aligned” status to negotiate with the European Union and other actors and agree on reasonable agendas that contribute to its economic, commercial and, above all, scientific-technological development.
It remains to be seen whether growing geopolitical tensions will pave the way for or hinder the strengthening of these ties. On the part of the European Union, the necessary reforms should be considered in relation to the current agreements under negotiation, making the general system of preferences more flexible, providing greater scope for the protection of new industries in Latin America and supporting access to financing for emerging technologies. For Latin America and the Caribbean, a central effect of the new situation is a reevaluation of alliances within the framework of calculated opportunity costs, where strategic rapprochement with the EU represents an opportunity to show a prudent balance in the face of growing polarization. Latin American and Caribbean demands, at the same time, allow them to narrow the gap with central countries.
