“America is not ready to defend itself or compete in the age of artificial intelligence.” Google’s former CEO Eric Schmidt began the reading in a report called the National Security Agency for Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI), which aims to make recommendations to the US Congress and the White House. Preserving American technological dominance.
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Schmidt’s team’s investigations turned out to be a glittering array of experts. During the commission’s more than three-year lifespan, former defense secretaries such as Ash Carter or William Perry worked alongside CEOs of companies such as Andy Jassy (Amazon Web Services), Safra Gates (Oracle) or Chris Darby (in-Q). -telephone) and a comprehensive academics. “China has emerged as a technological powerhouse at an extraordinary rate,” all agreed.
Schmidt continues to pull strings and prescribe indigestible pills so that his country can regain its “lost glory,” as he puts it. “America has long been technologically dominant, and the occupants of the Oval Office believe the country is safe.” However, “this interpretation is a mistake” because -he warns- “the Chinese chaos has taken the world by surprise and has produced implications that are still very difficult to understand”.
According to NSCAI, Beijing is acting as a “second digital superpower,” capable of leading and promoting a kind of innovative “alternative” to the United States.cut off region” is already created with two different technological ecosystems: American and Chinese. This “verifiable event” – he assures – “must be understood as a hostile declaration”, to which Washington has responded “without a clear strategy”, which in the future “will be more if it wants to continue to protect it”. “Freedom” digitally forces us to take risks. .
Schmidt’s early vision is from 2021, but it is valid because it affects the sustainability of this threat in the article’s introduction. US-China technological decoupling, Del Analyst Del Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, John Bateman, en Foreign policy. In this statement, he urges the White House to build barriers to technology transfers between the two superpowers.
In a short time, The Biden administration green-lighted a ban on trading in chips, semiconductors and technology Made in USA with Asian giant. Meanwhile, after these executive orders, the thesis that the United States not only did not want to prevent the disintegration of the global order that had ruled for the past four decades, but encouraged its imminent disintegration was strengthened.
However, some voices interpret this geostrategic game more accurately. One of them is Gregory Allen of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), who has been missing the start of this technological war for quite some time. China, without sponsoring a peaceful response, has already seen hostilities coming in 2018 and protected itself from US attacks, this analyst warns.
Chinese counterattack to US technological hostility
On October 7, 2022, the date Joe Biden signed China’s technology veto, new export rules aimed at isolating the evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) and the semiconductor industry from its rival, it was not at the center of the controversy. . That didn’t even happen when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the biggest geopolitical conflict of the year. For Allen, US retaliation against China since the democratic administration has the significance of marking a new era in bilateral relations between Washington and Beijing, but the “friction point” occurred in 2018. In particular, in April, the United States, in the midst of then-President Donald Trump’s tariff war, imposed “severe surveillance” on Chinese telecom giant ZTE’s operations on American soil.
China then understood that the technology and manufacturing sector of chips were considered strategic sectors and elements of national security. From that moment on, the Asian country had to try to avoid sophisticated US restrictions and focus on creating its own digital prototypes. On October 7, 2022, on a scale of 1 to 10, The Asian giant “I got 11th in both areas,” Allan admits wryly.
For this reason – the CSIS analyst adds – Beijing’s reaction seems to be “invisible”, reducing the filing of charges before the WTO arbitration panel or the announcement of subsidies for a trillion yuan to a mere diplomatic complaint (143,000 million dollars). But China is waiting to see how the White House manages the $465,000 million in guarantees and aid from Europe’s response to Biden’s Anti-Inflation Act (IRA) and “clear industrial protectionism” action. Xi Jinping.
Batman cements this digital divide between the two superpowers. “Washington has weakened its dominance” because “it has over the years built investor, business, university and knowledge, innovation and R&D or human capital ties” with China “despite its dubious legal business practices internationally.”
China’s geostrategic race
Biden’s containment measures — which he predicts in several parts of his book — “will help stem, but not contain, America’s bleeding.” cut off Acquired technology deficits are neither modified nor acquired. The forecast, shared by reports such as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), adds to the caution, expecting China to overtake the US in 37 of 44 key sectors of research and technology production for the development of AI between 2018 and 2022. “All Western democracies” are “losing global competitiveness” in the digitization process.
In 2018, fiscal injections began to address the weak points of some Chinese manufacturing metrics, under a climate of “protectionism and unilateralism,” where it is “very difficult to supply,” as Xi Jinping emphasized in 2018, referring to the United States. The roadmap is to “lead China to technological supremacy by 2025”. Since then, Beijing has infused its technology strategy with resources, particularly aimed at boosting the production of semiconductors.
Allen also warns that Beijing will make “no attempt to break the alliance between the United States and its European and Asian allies, or to promote contact between the business and military spheres in the technology market.” For now, the EU has strengthened its Atlantic gateway, raising the census of Chinese constituent entities that evade Russia’s veto, however, at the same time, showing division on the diplomatic strategy to follow with China, with France promoting a more conciliatory tone.
In a rare economic and investment scenario, the Treasury Secretary, Janet Yellen, and the National Security Adviser, Jack Sullivan, have both rejected globalization’s breakdown: “Separating our economies would be disastrous for the US and China. Yellen urged destabilization of the rest of the world. Some of the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, Approving the words, Sullivan noted, “We’re diversifying and diluting risks, not isolating global markets.”
George Friedman, founder of Geopolitical Futures, concludes that geopolitical and technological cycles overlap: “This technological disdain is not an accident or the result of a magical reality, but in the midst of major technological reinventions, with massive layoffs and redundancies. It connects episodes of innovation with industrial revolutions and changes in the world order. Their strategies have historical parallels.
